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FREEDOM TO MORPH?: AN ANALYSIS OF
MORPHED IMAGERY, CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT.
Katie H. Jung

Imagine innocently scrolling the internet and coming across a picture that
depicts the face of a known child, maybe that of a friend or even one’s own child,
upon the bodies of persons engaged in sexually explicit activity. Pictures
depicting child sexual abuse are damaging to a child’s reputation, to their future
career, and to their emotional and mental well-being.1 This problem is far worse
today than it has ever been, with estimates of 45 million images and videos of
children being reported in a single year.2 A greater problem with the growth of
the internet are “morphed images” – rather than traditional child pornography
which depicts the actual, sexual exploitation of a child, morphed images are
those images depicting real and recognizable faces of children superimposed
onto the bodies of adults engaged in sexually explicit activities.3


Juris Doctor, Candidate, Columbus School of Law, 2022; The Catholic University of
America Journal of Law and Technology, Editor-in-Chief, 2021-2022; Bachelor of Arts,
Hanover College, 2019. I would like to thank the entire editorial team of the Journal of Law
and Technology for their hard work and dedication to Volume 30. Many thanks to my expert
reader, Professor Mary Graw Leary, and her assistance throughout this process. Thank you
to my parents, Tom and Maribeth Koopman, and my husband, David Jung, who constantly
inspire me to achieve greatness in my academic career and life.
Congress attempted to change the use of the term “child pornography” to “child sexual
abuse material” as this not only more accurately depicts the content of the images, but the
term “child sexual abuse material” is more widely used across the world. EARN IT Act, S.
3398, 116th Cong. (2020).
2
Michael H. Keller & Gabriel J.X. Dance, The Internet Is Overrun with Images of
Child Sexual Abuse. What Went Wrong?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/09/28/us/child-sex-abuse.html.
3
United States v. Hotaling, 634 F.3d 725, 730 (2d Cir. 2011); Stacy Steinberg,
Changing Faces: Morphed Child Pornography Images and the First Amendment, 68 EMORY
1
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In 1998, reports of child pornography and sexual abuse imagery were over
3,000.4 The internet is the “compounding variable” that permits the retraumatization of children as sexually explicit images are perpetually shared,
accessed, and distributed.5 This material can be found on any online platform
and many victims continue to be haunted by these photographs for years, even
decades, after their victimization.6 The National Center for Missing and
Exploited Children suggests that because the problem has become so
widespread, and law enforcement agencies and technology companies have
failed to adequately stop the spread of these images, the only way to slow that
growth is to take advantage of the growing use of machine learning.7 Victims of
this abuse suffer psychological and mental trauma as a result of knowing their
images are on the internet, and in the traditional sense, many suffer the lasting
trauma of sexual abuse that took place in order to create those images.8 The
constant fear of being recognized because of these images is strong even decades
after these images have been produced.9
Traditional child sexual abuse materials are those images that depict children,
who are younger than 18 years old, engaged in sexually explicit activity.10 At
the other end of the spectrum is virtual child pornography, which are wholly
computer-generated images and do not involve the physical abuse of a child.11
Morphed imagery stands at the intersection of these two areas. Morphed imagery
includes images of real, innocent, and often recognizable children who have
been superimposed onto the images of adults engaged in sexually explicit
activity.12
This article will begin with a legal analysis of the development of child
pornography law as it relates to traditional child pornography, virtual child
pornography, and morphed imagery. First, there will be discussion regarding the
L. J. 909, 911 (2019).
4
Keller, supra note 2.
5
CAN. CTR. FOR CHILD PROT., SURVIVOR’S SURVEY EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 28 (2017).
6
Captured on Film: Survivors of Child Sexual Abuse Material Are Stuck in a Unique
Cycle of Trauma, NAT’L CTR. FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILD,
https://www.missingkids.org/content/dam/missingkids
/pdfs/Captured%20on%20Film.pdf (last visited Mar. 18, 2022); Child Sexual Abuse
Material, NAT’L CTR. FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILD,
https://www.missingkids.org/theissues/csam (last visited Mar. 18, 2022).
7
Keller, supra note 2.
8
Child Pornography, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/criminalceos/child-pornography (last visited Dec. 5, 2020); Keller, supra note 2.
9
Keller, supra note 2.
10 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (2018); see also Child Sexual Abuse Material, supra note 6.
11 Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, H.R. 4123, 104th Cong. § 3(8) (1996).
12 United States v. Hotaling, 634 F.3d 725, 729–30 (2d Cir. 2011); Steinberg, supra note
3, at 911.
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background of the First Amendment, highlighting Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire. The analysis focuses on Congress’ approach to regulating child
pornography and the Supreme Court’s attempt to remedy it with the First
Amendment and will delve into Miller v. California and New York v. Ferber,
two of the early cases establishing the regulations on child pornography. The
article will then chronologically discuss the Child Pornography Prevention Act
of 1996, much of which was subsequently rejected by Ashcroft v. Free Speech
Coalition and the subsequent passage of the PROTECT Act by Congress. There
is a discussion of the current circuit split regarding whether morphed imagery
falls within protected First Amendment speech. Additionally, the current
statutory laws relating to child pornography and morphed imagery’s place within
those laws will be analyzed. Finally, the discussion will conclude with a legal
analysis of the history of child pornography regulation and its emphasis on a
child’s wellbeing. That section will put particular emphasis on the inability of
the Supreme Court to have known the rapid nature of technological growth and
their reticence in applying any standards to the issue of morphed imagery, only
that these types of images may fall closer to those traditional child pornography
images because they include photographs of real children.13 This section will
end with a comparison to another realm of pornography regulation, revenge
pornography, which is criminalized in 46 states.14
I. HISTORY OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY LAW
It is necessary at the outset of a discussion of child pornography and the harms
caused to children to differentiate child pornography from the traditional
understanding of pornography.15 Every child depicted in child pornography has
suffered a crime and is inherently the victim of sexual abuse, meaning “each
image graphically memorializes the sexual abuse of that child.”16 The issue of
online child pornography is an exceedingly large and growing problem, proving
it to be even too large for law enforcement to successfully manage.17 Child
pornography is an increasing issue in society and is exacerbated by the rapidly
increasing access to technology.18 Every year more than 25 million images are
reviewed by the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children.19 Children
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 242 (2002).
46 States + DC + One Territory Now Have Revenge Porn Laws, CYBER CIV. RTS.
INST., https://www.cybercivilrights.org/revenge-porn-laws/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2022).
15 Child Pornography, supra note 8.
16 Id.
17 Keller, supra note 2.
18 Child Pornography and Abuse Statistics, THORN, https://www.thorn.org/childpornography-and-abuse-statistics/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2022).
19 Id.
13
14

36

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY
JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY

[Vol. 30.2

of all ages are included in these images.20 Because these often depict the violent
sexual abuse of children, there is a push to change the term “child pornography”
to “child sexual abuse material” which would properly describe the types of
images that are being distributed.21 The Department of Justice even indicates the
term “[child pornography] fails to describe the true horror that is faced by
countless children every year.”22
The victimization of children does not end when the sexual abuse captured by
photograph or video is over, rather, in most cases, child pornography is the
permanent record of abuse and cause those who are abused to “suffer a lifetime
of re-victimization by knowing the images of their sexual abuse are on the
Internet forever.”23 The Canadian Center for Child Protection estimates that over
78% of the child pornography images they assessed depicted children younger
than twelve years old and over 60% of those were children under eight.24 The
problem is that there is a great divide among the pictures that are disseminated:
some images are of an extremely violent and explicit nature while others may
not be.25 Public ignorance to the magnitude of this issue and the lack of
discussion on the topic itself has exacerbated the misunderstanding of just how
violent, damaging, and pervasive this problem is in society.
Technology has made this problem increasingly worse, because not only do
the images remain online forever, but anyone from anywhere in the world can
also view them.26 The market for child exploitation and child pornography can
be traced alongside of the growth and popularization of the internet to the extent
that the market for child pornography decreased in the 1990s and boomed again
with the advent of the internet.27 Today, the problem continues to increase.28 For
example, in 2004, the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children
reviewed 450,000 child sexual abuse files, and in 2019, that number jumped to
70 million.29 Moreover, people who create, share, and view this content have an
20 EARN IT Act, S. 3398 § 6, 116th Cong. (2020); see also Child Abuse Statistics,
THORN, https://www.thorn.org/child-pornography-and-abuse-statistics/ (last visited Dec. 5,
2020).
21 EARN IT Act, S. 3398 § 6, 116th Cong. (2020); see also Child Abuse Statistics,
supra note 20.
22 Child Pornography, supra note 8.
23 See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 (1982); Child Pornography, supra note 8.
24 Child Sexual Abuse Images on the Internet, CAN. CTR FOR CHILD PROT. (Jan. 2016),
http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/2699673/Cybertip-ca-CSAResearchReport-2016En.pdf.
25 Child Pornography, supra note 8.
26 Id.
27 Id.; Child Sexual Exploitation and Technology, THORN, https://www.thorn.org/childsexual-exploitation-and-technology/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2022).
28 Id.
29 Id.
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easier time connecting online and have a wider network to engage with this
material.30 There are many aspects of technology that allow this market to
flourish with little to no prosecution; “encryption, key-chain storage . . . peer-topeer networks,” and Internet relay chat rooms are all used by child
pornographers and pedophiles to correspond and share their illegal content with
stomach-turning efficiency.31 This allows those interested in these images a safe
environment to promote their communication, shielded from public scrutiny,
meaning it is “desensitizing those involved to the physical and psychological
damages caused to the child victims.”32 If the issues of child pornography are
going to be solved, it is necessary for governments and agencies to figure out
how to manage online platforms that proliferate these crimes.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A short analysis of First Amendment jurisprudence related to the issue of
pornography is relevant because traditional pornography, i.e., that which depicts
adults, is generally protected speech under the First Amendment given that it is
not “patently offensive.”33 Child pornography, on the other hand, falls outside
of the traditional protections of the First Amendment, as discussed below.34
Morphed imagery sits between traditional pornography and child pornography
– posing a new set of legal issues related to First Amendment regulation.
The First Amendment in pertinent part states “Congress shall make no law . .
. abridging the freedom of speech.”35 The drafters of the U.S. Constitution
created the Bill of Rights in response to the fear that without it, the government
would be able to restrict personal liberties, and because they saw the freedom to
speak freely without government regulation as a natural right, they intended the
First Amendment to put some types of speech out of the reach of government
regulation.36 The Anti-Federalists, who advocated for limited central
government and stronger powers with the state and local governments,
championed the Bill of Rights and believed it was necessary to ensure that
individual liberties would be protected from governmental intrusion.37
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire held that outside of First Amendment lie
Child Pornography and Abuse Statistics, supra note 16.
John Foley, Technology and the Fight Against Child Porn, INFO.WEEK (Feb. 11,
2005), https://www.informationweek.com/technology-and-the-fight-against-child-porn/d/did/1030321.
32 Child Pornography, supra note 8.
33 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973); see U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
34 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982). See text accompanying note 35–51.
35 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
36 Bill of Rights (1791), BILL OF RIGHTS INST., https://billofrightsinstitute.org/primarysources/bill-of-rights (last visited Mar. 20, 2022).
37 Id.
30
31
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“certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech.”38 This class of
speech includes the obscene and lewd speech which, by its nature, plays no role
in furthering ideas that have “such slight social value . . . that any benefit that
may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order
and morality.”39 The regulation of child pornography began with the
understanding that children are uniquely harmed in both the production of child
pornography and also its distribution and therefore lies outside of the
traditionally understood boundaries of the First Amendment.40
When the government wants to restrict a person’s speech based on its content,
it must survive a strict scrutiny test.41 To survive strict scrutiny, the government
must prove that a regulation of speech is justified by a compelling state interest
and is carried out in the least restrictive means, or in other words, is narrowly
tailored to serve the purported government interest.42 However, despite the
strong protections of speech in the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has
consistently held some categories of speech that lie outside of these protections
and can be regulated by the Government.43 Furthermore, the intention of the First
Amendment was not “to protect every utterance.”44
Child pornography is one area which comes into conflict with the protections
granted by the First Amendment.45 Throughout the last 100 years, the
government has addressed and worked to solve the problems presented by child
pornography, however since the 1990s and the advent of technology the issue
has become exceedingly complicated.46 Some even argue the problem of child
pornography slowed significantly before the 90s, but subsequently exploded due
to the advent of the internet and technology.47 The scale of the problem can be
seen by the exponential growth in the difference between the amount of files
reviewed by the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children in 2004—
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942).
Id. at 572; see also Roth v. United States, 342 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (holding
explicitly that obscenity is outside First Amendment protection).
40 Mary Graw Leary, Self-Produced Child Pornography: The Appropriate Societal
Response to Juvenile Self-Sexual Exploitation, 15 VA. J. OF SOC. POL’Y & THE L. 1, 3, 10
(2008); see U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
41 Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011).
42 Id.
43 James Nicholas Kornegay, Protecting Our Children and the Constitution: An
Analysis of the “Virtual” Child Pornography Provisions of the Protect Act of 2003, 47 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 2129, 2133 (2006).
44 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957).
45 Todd Carville, The Constitutionality of Criminalizing Virtual Child Pornography,
SYRACUSE L. & TECH. J. 5, 4–5 (2002).
46 Id. at 2; Lydia W. Lee, Note, Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996:
Confronting the Challenges of Virtual Reality, 8 S. CAL. INTERDIS. L. J. 639, 644 (1999).
47 Child Sexual Exploitation and Technology, supra note 27.
38
39
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450,000—compared to the seventy million files reviewed in 2019.48
Child pornography is defined as the visual depiction of children engaged in
“sexually explicit conduct.”49 Before the advent of technology, there was little
to distinguish between the harms of creation versus the harms of dissemination
of child pornography because most, if not all, child pornography involved the
sexual abuse of children.50 Because some of the definitions and controlling
jurisprudence occurred before the problem of morphed imagery arose, they are
sometimes inadequate to properly balance the unique situation morphed images
pose in relation to the with the liberties protected by the First Amendment.51
The problem of morphed imagery poses a tough legal question because it sits
at the intersection of one of the most fundamental liberties cherished by every
American, the Freedom of Speech, and the protection of children from sexual
exploitation who may not have been physically abused, but who are recognizable
in these sometimes violent and gruesome images. Consistently this has
translated into the courts needing to find a balance between protecting this
fundamental liberty and recognizing the issue of morphed imagery is one that
the law absolutely has to address. The following legal background attempts to
paint a picture of the difficulty the legislature and courts have had with
reconciling these competing interests.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Before the issue of child pornography came to the Supreme Court, the Court
first had to deal with the issue of obscenity and whether it qualified as protected
speech within the meaning of the First Amendment.52 One fundamental case
related to the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in the context of obscenity is the
1973 case of Miller v. California.53 The issue before the Supreme Court was
regarded the scope of the First Amendment prohibition on obscene speech.54 The
factual scenario in this case did not involve the use of children, but rather
pornographic materials of adults engaged in sexually explicit activity.55 The
court laid out three factors to consider when determining if a work was obscene
and, therefore, without First Amendment protection: (1) the average person
“would find that the work taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest;” (2)
the work “depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct . . .
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55

Id.
18 U.S.C § 2256(8).
Steinberg, supra note 3, at 913.
Id.
See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 19–20 (1973).
See generally id.
Id. at 19–20.
Id. at 18.
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designed by state . . . law;” and (3) “whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”56 The Supreme Court
stated that the protections of the First Amendment apply to “obscene material”
only when the “prurient, patently offensive depiction or description of sexual
conduct” has “serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value to merit First
Amendment protection.”57
The underlying issue with the regulation of child pornography is the middle
ground between traditional child pornography, where children are used in the
production of the pornography, and virtual pornography which is “created by
using adults who look like minors or by using computer imaging.”58 Traditional
child pornography is not protected speech under the First Amendment, while
virtual child pornography is.59 In the context of adult material and the First
Amendment, it is clear the Supreme Court worked to strike a balance between
protecting the freedom of speech with ensuring obscene materials did not
become mainstream and pervasive in society.60 However, this framework fails
to adequately regulate materials that portray the sexual abuse of children.
Further, this framework fails at remedying the problem when no actual child is
physically harmed or abused in the making of certain materials. Historically, the
Bill of Rights intended to keep some materials outside of First Amendment
protection, including obscene materials, but the Supreme Court often struggled
to define what qualified as obscene.61 The next sections detail the Supreme
Court’s challenge in striking this balance when it comes to the regulation of child
pornography.
A. Relevant Statutory Provisions
Child pornography is defined as “any visual depiction, including any
photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or computer-generated image or
picture, whether or not produced by electronic, mechanical, or other means, of
sexually explicit conduct.”62 Visual depiction includes “undeveloped film and
Id. at 24.
Id. at 26.
58 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 239–40 (2002); United States v.
Mecham, 950 F.3d 257, 260 (5th Cir. 2020).
59 Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 256; Mecham, 950 F.3d at 260.
60 Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
61 See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982) (holding traditional child
pornography outside of First Amendment protection regardless of whether it is obscene);
First Amendment, THE HISTORY CHANNEL, https://www.history.com/topics/united-statesconstitution/first-amendment, (Sept. 25, 2019).
62 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (defining sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of this section
as “(1) graphic sexual intercourse, or (2) bestiality, masturbation, or sadistic or masochistic
56
57
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video tape, data stored on computer disk or by electronic means which is capable
of conversion into a visual image that has been transmitted by any means,
whether or not stored in a permanent format.”63 Photographs, videos, digital or
computer generated images must be an actual minor, or indistinguishable from
an actual minor, who is engaging in sexually explicit conduct.64 This also
includes visual depictions that have “been created, adapted, or modified to
appear” to include an indefinable minor.65 The definition includes those images
that may be just of children that are “sufficiently sexually suggestive” even if
that child is not engaged in sexual acts.66 The Federal Government generally has
jurisdiction when the internet is involved.67
B. New York v. Ferber
Before federal law was promulgated on this issue, the Supreme Court in New
York v. Ferber upheld a New York statute related to the regulation of child
pornography.68 This case involved the owner of a bookstore in Manhattan, New
York who was convicted under a New York statute for distributing videos
depicting boys under the age of sixteen masturbating.69 The statute prohibited
“persons from knowingly promoting sexual performances by children under 16
by distributing material which depicts such performances.”70
The Supreme Court held child pornography falls outside of First Amendment
protection, regardless of whether it is obscene under the standard set forth in
Miller.71 The Supreme Court turned its focus to the production of the materials
themselves in addition to the content depicted in the materials.72 The court
analyzed the validity of two New York statutes which made it a crime to

abuse, or (3) lewd display of genitals.”).
63 18 U.S.C. § 2256(5).
64 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B).
65 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(C).
66 Citizen’s Guide to U.S. Federal Law on Child Pornography, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-ceos/citizens-guide-us-federal-law-child-pornography (last
updated May 28, 2020).
67 Id.
68 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 773–74 (1982).
69 Id. at 751–52.
70 Id. at 749.
71 See generally id. at 764 (holding that when “the balance of competing interests is
clearly struck…it is permissible to consider these materials as without the protection of the
First Amendment”); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (defining the scope of
regulation as limited to “works which, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in
sex, which portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and which, taken as a whole,
do not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value”).
72 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 749.
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knowingly authorize a child to participate in sexual acts.73 The New York
appellate court affirmed the trial court’s ruling, finding Ferber guilty under
section 263.15 of the New York Penal Code, which prohibited “promoting a
sexual performance by a child.”74 This law did not require that the material
shown to have been created or disseminated by the defendant to be obscene.75
The single issue before the Supreme Court in this case was “[t]o prevent the
abuse of children who are made to engage in sexual conduct for commercial
purposes, could the New York legislature, consistent with the First Amendment,
prohibit the dissemination of material which shows children engaged in sexual
conduct, regardless of whether such material is obscene[.]”76
To answer this question, the Supreme Court lays out five reasons in support
of placing child pornography in the category of unprotected speech.77 Ultimately
the Court holds states have more flexibility in their regulations of child
pornography and such regulations, the Court concludes, do not offend the First
Amendment.78 First, the State has a compelling interest in “safeguarding the
physical and psychological well-being of a minor.”79 There are psychological,
emotional, and mental health concerns when it comes to the production of child
pornography, and because many states have already passed successful
legislation protection these aspects of a child’s wellbeing the Court believes that
this is permissible under the First Amendment.80 The Court unapologetically
states that this interest is paramount to a well-functioning and democratic society
and because this law was enacted by the legislature of the state of New York that
the court should not engage in second guessing the legislature’s determination
in protecting and regulating this concern.81 Protecting the interests of children is
one of the strongest interests the government can assert, and it is this concern
that ultimately leads to the issue of government regulation. This is because the
government may assert the interest in protecting children, but how far that
interest extends when technological advances come into play is a question that
the court must resolve.
Second, child pornography is “intrinsically related” to the sexual abuse of
73 Id. at 750–51; N.Y. Penal Law §263.05 (McKinney 2001) (noting that the age of the
statute has been raised to seventeen).
74 N.Y. Penal Law § 263.15 (McKinney 2001).
75 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 751.
76 Id. at 753.
77 Id. at 756–74.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 756–57.
80 Id. at 757–58.
81 Id. at 757–58; see also Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944) (“[A]
democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of
young people into full maturity as citizens.”).
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minors in two ways.82 The production is a “permanent record of the child’s
participation” and distribution itself intensifies the harms to the children as the
materials are circulated.83 Moreover, regulating and effectively extinguishing
the distribution of child pornography is required to get at the production of said
materials: in other words, to control the supply of the child pornography market
it is necessary to control the distribution market at the outset.84 Again, the
Supreme Court emphasizes the legislature’s response to a hard-to-control
problem and insists that it is not outside of the purview of the legislature to
determine that effectively extinguishing the network of child pornography
would include pursing those who distribute alongside of those who produce.85
This is an interesting supply and demand argument from the Court: essentially
arguing that to effectively extinguish the supply it is necessary to get at the entire
supply chain.86 Without the distribution channels and those who distribute and
sell there would be no market for child pornography and the court emphasizes
that this could be the avenue to strangle production.87
The Supreme Court reasons “[t]he most expeditious if not the only practical
method of law enforcement may be to dry up the market for this material” and
rejects the idea that this type of regulation must stay within the boundaries set
by Miller, but rather insists in light of how compelling the state’s interest is in
regulating child pornography that state regulation may go further than the
standards set forth by Miller.88
The standard in Miller does not account for the particular sensitives involving
child pornography, nor fully encapsulate the state’s interest in regulating these
materials, which is why the Court extends protections to child pornography even
further than the analysis of obscene speech.89 The first prong of the Miller test,
whether the work “appeals to the prurient interest,” has no connection to the
sexual abuse children face in the production of child pornography.90 The second
prong, whether the work is “patently offensive” may include materials even
where children are sexually abused in their production.91 The third prong,
relating to the “literary, artistic, political or scientific value,” is inconsequential
to children who have been sexually abused in the process.92 In the context of
traditional child sexual abuse material, it is logical that Miller would not apply
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92

Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 759–60.
See generally id.
See generally id.
Id. at 760–61.
Id. at 761.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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because this material can never have redeeming qualities if it depicts the actual
abuse of a child.
Third, there is an “economic motive” to continue advertising and selling child
pornography and therefore fuels its production and subsequent distribution.93
The First Amendment has never protected speech which is “used as an integral
part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute.”94
Fourth, there is likely no important or necessary value added to either
scientific or educational work, nor to literary or artistic works by having a child
engaged in obscene sexual acts.95 Any value gained from permitting these types
of depictions, the court explains, is likely de minimus.96 There is nothing
stopping someone from using a person of age to get across the same artistic point
that they would with a person who is underage.97 The Court is not saying that
the depictions are in and of themselves a violation of the First Amendment, but
rather the use of children is what is unprotected by the First Amendment.98 This
leaves open other channels for achieving the same end; using persons who
appear to be younger would be one such example.
Fifth, “recognizing and classifying child pornography as a category . . .
outside the protection of the First Amendment is not incompatible with our
earlier decisions.”99 Moreover, the opinion acknowledges that determining
whether a type of speech receives First Amendment protection is based on its
content.100 In this case, it is the content that determines to what extent it is
obscene and either deserving of First Amendment protection or not.101
Therefore, it is permissible to regulate child pornography in this way, because it
is well settled that some categories are within a certain class of speech that are
not protected and may be generalized as such.102 The Court, it seems, pays its
respect to well settled First Amendment jurisprudence and squarely aligns its
decision in Ferber with the already established categories of speech that fall
outside of First Amendment protection. By doing this, the rationales for keeping
child pornography as an unprotected class are strengthened through its own
reasoning and stare decisis.

Id.
Id. at 761–92 (quoting Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498
(1949)).
95 Id. at 762–63.
96 Id. at 762.
97 Id. at 763.
98 See id.
99 Id.
100 Id. (citing Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 66 (1976)).
101 Id. at 763.
102 Id at 763–64.
93
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C. Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996
After Ferber, Congress, with the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996
(the “CPPA”), expanded the definition of child pornography to include “any
visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or
computer-generated image or picture, whether made or produced by electronic,
mechanical, or other means, of sexually explicit conduct, where . . . such visual
depiction is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually explicit
conduct.”103 The purpose of the CPPA was to address the problem of those
images which, at the time, were being created by developing computer
technology.104 These newly created virtual images are “virtually
indistinguishable” from “unretouched photographic images of actual children
engaging in sexually explicit conduct” and therefore the definition needed to
expand beyond what it previously encompassed to fit these changing
technological capabilities.105 Part of Congress’ concern was the potential for
future harm done to children in the circulation of the materials, because these
virtual images could be used in the future to solicit real children for the making
of child pornography.106 Congress discussed its fear that sexual predators and
those interested in viewing and creating child pornography would use these
virtual images to “stimulate and whet their own sexual appetites.”107 The Court
decided that, while this statute is objectively working to prevent a serious wrong
that is prolific in our society, that this does not excuse the constitutional violation
of the overbroad nature of the CPPA, which is addressed by the Supreme Court
in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition.108
While the nature of the CPPA was to address the problem Congress saw with
the rise of child pornography and morphed imagery, their reach into the realm
of images created without the use of children appears overboard and an
unconstitutional violation of free speech.109 The problem that Congress faces,
however, is sometimes these images are indistinguishable from those images
that implicate the interests of real children.110
18 U.S.C. § 2256(8).
S. REP. NO. 104-358, at 7 (1996); see also Sarah Sternberg, The Child Pornography
Prevention Act of 1996 and the First Amendment: Virtual Antitheses, 69 FORDHAM L. REV.
2783, 2796 (2001).
105 S. REP. NO. 104-358, at 2 (1996); see also Sternberg, supra note 104, at 2796.
106 Steinberg, supra note 3, at 916; Sternberg, supra note 104, at 2786 (noting that child
predators may use these online images to groom potential victims into believing the types of
behavior they are encouraging them to engage in is normal and to allow them to victimize
more children).
107 S. REP. NO. 104-358, at 2 (1996)
108 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 256, 258 (2002); Kornegay, supra note
43, at 2147.
109 Sternberg, supra note 104, at 2800.
110 S. REP. NO. 104-358, at 2 (1996); see also Sternberg, supra note 104, at 2796.
103
104
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This illustrates the forefront problem with regulating morphed imagery – if
Congress and the Courts ultimately decide they need to protect those images that
do fall within First Amendment protection, there is likely going to be a class of
persons continually affected by morphed imagery because there is no way to
distinguish the materials and prohibiting all of them is unconstitutional under
current legal frameworks. The moral and legal dilemma then is how far do First
Amendment protections go when there are known consequences to upholding
those protections, such as the dissemination of materials that include the images
of known children engaged in sexually explicit actions. From a moral standpoint,
it is obvious that one would desire to regulate every image because the protection
of children is of the utmost importance.111 However, the Supreme Court
continually holds that morally abhorrent speech is protected because of the broad
application of the First Amendment and that only historically well-established
categories of speech will be excluded from protection.112
D. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition
The constitutionality of the CPPA was challenged in Ashcroft v. Free Speech
Coalition, and the question presented to the Court was whether it offended the
First Amendment’s freedom of speech protections to prohibit pornographic
images of children that were digitally created in an ever changing technological
world.113 The respondents in Ashcroft challenged this type of regulation as
overbroad, and the Supreme Court ultimately agreed.114 The issue is the CPPA
prohibits not only child pornography in its original sense, but also prohibits
“sexually explicit images that appear to depict minors but were produced
without using any real children.”115 The Supreme Court reasons that the types of
images that are being regulated by the statute neither get at obscenity under the
Miller standard nor conform to the definition of child pornography set forth in
Ferber.116 This is because, as a general rule, prohibitions are only proper when
pornography is obscene, and therefore fall outside of First Amendment
protections, or if the works include images of children for all of the reasons set

See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982).
United States v. Playboy Ent. Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000) (noting that “moral
judgements about art and literature . . . are for the individual to make, not for the
Government to decree, even with the mandate or approval of a majority”); see also U.S.
CONST. Amend. 1; See generally Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011)
(holding that violent video games were protected by the First Amendment).
113 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 239–40 (2002).
114 Id. at 258.
115 Id. at 239.
116 Id.
111
112
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forth in Ferber.117 Before the enactment of the CPPA, there were two ways the
government could restrict child pornography: either under the obscenity
standard set forth in Miller or through Ferber’s prohibition of child pornography
produced through the abuse of children.118
Miller requires the Government to prove the work in question “taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest, is patently offensive in light of
community standards, and lack serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value.”119 The CPPA does not require the threshold of what interest the materials
appeal to, only that they be depictions of children engaged in sexual acts.120
Thus, a picture containing depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit
activity, even if it has redeeming qualities or if it only appears to be minor
engaged in the activity, would be a violation of the CPPA.121 Moreover, works
with only a few instances of what the CPPA determines as outside of protections
would as a whole be prohibited, when Miller emphasizes taking the work as a
whole to determine obscenity.122
One of the primary rationales for the blanket prohibition of child pornography
in Ferber was its intimate relationship to the harms caused to children, both in
the depiction of the sexual abuse of children and in the harms cause through
repeated distribution.123 Starting with the proposition that “pornography can be
banned only if obscene” Ferber laid out the foundation for when child
pornography can be banned without it also conforming to Miller.124 The Court
made distinctions between virtual pornography and traditional child
pornography, the former being what Congress aimed to regulate in the CPPA.125
Virtual pornography are those original images that are computer, computer
generated, or produced by traditional means that portray what looks as if there
are minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct.126 The Court held, despite there
being an interest in protecting children from the harm caused by child
pornography, that the CPPA went too far in regulating virtual images to prevent

117 Id. (emphasizing that child pornography enjoys no protection under the First
Amendment whether it is obscene or not).
118 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24–
25 (1973); Brian G. Slocum, Virtual Child Pornography: Does It Mean the End of the Child
Pornography Exception to the First Amendment?, 14 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 637, 650
(2004).
119 Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 240; Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
120 Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 240.
121 Id. at 241.
122 Id. at 246; Miller, 413 U.S. at 24–25.
123 Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 240; Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759.
124 Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 240; Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
125 Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 241.
126 Id.
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future harm.127
The Supreme Court declined to address the underlying and growing issue: the
issue of morphed imagery. However, the Court acknowledges that these types
of images may fall closer to the Ferber standard because the interests of real
children are implicated.128 Morphed images are created when innocent pictures
of real children are altered in such a way that the child appears to be engaged in
sexual activity or combined with either a virtual image or an image of an adult
who is engaged in sexual activity.129 Congress was determined after the decision
in this case to find a workable solution aimed at curbing the rise of these
morphed images, while also maintaining the protections of Free Speech.130
E. Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of
Children Today Act of 2003
In response to the decision in Ashcroft, Congress again considered the rising
issue of virtual child pornography and morphed imagery with the Prosecutorial
Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of
2003 (the “PROTECT Act”).131 Congress recognized the Ferber decision may
not have been able to fully encompass where the technology was headed because
the technology to create virtual pornography and morphed images did not exist
at the time Ferber was decided.132 Moreover, many believe that Ashcroft was
incorrectly decided, because the CPPA failed to acknowledge the implications
regarding real harm done to real children that were at the forefront of the Ferber
decision.133
At the time of the PROTECT Act, the technology was capable of creating:
Computer generated depictions of children that are indistinguishable
from depictions of real children; use parts of images of real children
to create a composite image that is unidentifiable as a particular child
and in a way that prevents even an expert from concluding that parts
of images of real children were used; disguise pictures of real
children being abused by making the image look computer
generated.134
Id. at 245.
Id. at 242.
129 Id.; see also Steinberg, supra note 3, at 919.
130 Steinberg, supra note 3, at 919.
131 Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today
Act of 2003, Pub. L. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003).
132 Id.
133 Kornegay, supra note 43, at 2147.
134 Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today
Act of 2003, Pub. L. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650, 676 (2003).
127
128

2022]

Morphed Imagery and the First Amendment

49

The technology available at the time of the PROTECT Act allowed creators
to manipulate images such that they became unidentifiable as either real children
or if they had been created virtually.135 Congress is clear regarding the Ashcroft
holding: its backlash is already apparent, and it is creating problems for the
prosecution of child pornography.136 The congressional findings put forth the
troubling situation, because the burden of proof is on the government to prove
that a real child is harmed in the specific pornography at issue, with the advent
of new technology it is harder for the government to prove leading more persons
to assert that the images at issue are not of real children.137
This Act is known as a gray area in the law of child pornography.138 Because
the court in Ashcroft decided not to weigh in on the issue of morphed imagery,
Congress had leeway in finding a workaround to the holding of Ashcroft.139 It
appears that because the Supreme Court failed to weigh in on the issue, they may
have been looking for Congress to readdress their concerns from the PROTECT
Act and try to find another remedy to the situation that would not violate the
Freedom of Speech. Again, this case further exemplifies the difficulty in finding
a balance between protecting a liberty interest and protecting children, where
technology makes its nearly impossible to differentiate between the two types of
pornography at issue.140
F.

United States v. Stevens

The court in Ferber found that child pornography is outside of the First
Amendment protection not by engaging in a “balancing of competing interests,”
but because the production of child pornography necessarily involves child
abuse, which is illegal, and is already within a well-established category of
speech that historically lies outside of the bubble of First Amendment
protection.141 In United States v. Stevens, the Court stated their previous
decisions related to child pornography and other First Amendment claims
“cannot be taken as establishing a freewheeling authority to declare new
Kornegay, supra note 43, at 2148.
Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today
Act of 2003, Pub. L. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650, 677 (2003); see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech
Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 263 (2002) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Of even more serious concern
is the prospect that defendants indicted for the production, distribution, or possession of
actual-child pornography may evade liability by claiming that these images . . . are in fact
computer-generated.”).
137 Kornegay, supra note 43, at 2148.
138 Steinberg, supra note 3, at 918.
139 Id. at 919.
140 See Kornegay, supra note 43, at 2148.
141 United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 471 (2010); see also New York v. Ferber, 458
U.S. 747, 765 (1982).
135
136
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categories of speech outside the scope of the First Amendment.”142 Moreover,
they urge that the proper inquiry in addressing child pornography is as a category
of speech outside of the First Amendment, and not based on a “simple cost
benefit analysis.”143
Because of this, there is no clear way for the courts to address the issue of
morphed imagery when it is presented. The Supreme Court has given little
guidance when it comes to morphed imagery. Only those images created without
any identifiable child and not implicating the interests of a child will be protected
by the First Amendment.144 In other words, virtual pornography is protected. At
the other end of the spectrum, those images that obviously involve the abuse of
children, as evidenced by the holding in Ferber, will not be protected under the
First Amendment.145 The middle ground is when the images implicate the
interest of children, but does not involve the abuse of those children.146 Courts
are left to wade through the complicated legal and legislative history. This has
resulted in a circuit split. The Second, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits all indicate that
this imagery falls outside of First Amendment protection while the Eighth
Circuit has held that this falls within the protections of the First Amendment.147
The foregoing analysis lays the foundation for establishing the current middle
ground in the regulation of child pornography.148 The following analysis
presents the circuit split and the analysis each Circuit has taken on this issue.
IV. CIRCUIT SPLIT
A. Second Circuit
The Second Circuit addressed the issue in United States v. Hotaling in
2011.149 The defendant, Hotaling, was charged for having created and in his
possession child pornography of six minor females, which he had digitally
altered through “morphing.”150 He had imposed the heads of the minor females
from nonpornographic pictures onto the bodies of adult women who were
engaged in “sexually explicit conduct.”151 Additionally, these images included
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151

Stevens, 559 U.S. at 472.
Id. at 471.
Steinberg, supra note 3, at 911.
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764.
Steinberg, supra note 3, at 911.
See, infra Section IV.
Steinberg, supra note 3, at 918.
United States v. Hotaling, 634 F.3d 725 (2d Cir. 2011).
Id. at 727.
Id.
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the actual names of the children whose pictures he used in creating these
images.152 The court focused on whether these types of morphed images
implicated the same concerns that the Supreme Court laid out in Ferber.153
There is a “long recognized” assertion that “the government has a compelling
interest in protecting minors from becoming victims of child pornography
because of the physiological, reputational and emotional harm that the
distribution of such material imposes on them.”154 Hotaling argued that these
images were protected under the First Amendment because it was an expression
of his “mental fantasies” and no actual children were harmed in the making of
the images.155 Moreover, he argued his pictures were distinguished from earlier
cases from other circuits, because his morphed imagery did not include those
images of children being abused in their production and is therefore
distinguished from an Eight Circuit holding and protected under the First
Amendment.156
The first issue the court tackled was whether morphed child pornography,
which shows the face of a child, but the body of an adult, is protected expressive
speech under the First Amendment.157 The Second Circuit was clear, “the
interests of actual minors are implicated when their faces are used in creating
morphed images that make it appear that they are performing sexually explicit
acts.”158 Hotaling’s argument was therefore rejected; it is inconsequential if the
explicit images included minors.159 The Second Circuit distinguishes this case
from Ashcroft because “the interests of actual minors are implicated”— there
were identifiable faces of minors edited in such a way that the identifiable
portion of the pictures were of those faces of minors and further the defendant
had used the actual names of the girls on many of the images.160 It seems natural
the court would have chosen to align these images with that of Ferber
considering the gravity of harm done and the recognizable nature of the children
involved. However, the court does not give any indication what it might have
done if it was not as clear whether these images included the interests of

Id.
Id. at 728–29.
154 Id. at 728.
155 Id. at 727.
156 Id. at 729; see United States v. Bach, 400 F.3d 622, 632 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that
the defendant’s morphed imagery was outside of the protection of the First Amendment for
expressive images because the images used and morphed the faces of minors engaging in
explicit sexual conduct, thereby implicating the concerns of the Ferber court that real
children were harmed in the production of those images).
157 Hotaling, 634 F.3d at 728.
158 Id. at 729–30.
159 Id. at 730.
160 Id. at 729–30.
152
153
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identifiable children.161 As far as the Second Circuit is concerned, this appears
to be a lingering issue without a remedy.162
B. Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit similarly held to keep morphed images depicting identifiable
minors outside of the realm of First Amendment protection in United States v.
Mecham.163 Here, the court considered to what extent the First Amendment
protected images that are between real child pornography and virtual child
pornography.164 In this case, the defendant, Clifford Mecham, had digitally
altered images of adults engaged in sexually explicit conduct to include the faces
of his minor grandchildren which made them appear to be engaging in the sexual
conduct.165 The court phrases the issue of morphed imagery as “[u]nlike virtual
pornography, this “morphed” child pornography uses an image of a real child
[and] [l]ike virtual pornography, however, no child actually engaged in sexually
explicit conduct.”166 The court in Mecham reaffirms that obscenity is outside of
First Amendment protection.167
However, the court states material including sexual imagery in and of itself
does not make it inherently obscene, and therefore outside of First Amendment
protection, and goes on to discuss the development of the Supreme Court’s
approach to child pornography regulation.168 Moreover, the court emphasizes
that in Ashcroft, while not addressing the issue of morphed child pornography
directly, states that morphed images do “implicate the interest of real children
and are in that sense closer to the images in Ferber.”169 The challenge for the
Fifth Circuit was, since the Supreme Court had not yet weighed in on the issue
of morphed imagery, to determine whether the images at issue are “close enough
to real child pornography to constitute unprotected speech.”170 The Supreme
See generally id.
See generally id.
163 United States v. Mecham, 950 F.3d 257, 267 (5th Cir. 2020).
164 Id. at 260.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id. at 261.
168 Id.; see also Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957) (stating that sex and
obscenity are not one in the same and is therefore not sufficient in and of itself to be denied
Constitutional protection because of obscenity and for sex to be obscene it must be “material
which deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest.”).
169 Mecham, 950 F.3d at 263 (quoting Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 242
(2002)).
170 Id. (nothing that to determine if images are protected or not within the meaning of the
First Amendment jurisprudence it is necessary to determine whether they are more like
imagery that involves the direct abuse of children, i.e., traditional child pornography, or
161
162
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Court has suggested that these types of images do fall close to traditional images
of child pornography, which involve the direct abuse of children, rather than
wholly virtual child pornography and therefore are unprotected.171 Thus, the
Fifth Circuit’s analysis turns on the issue of whether there was an identifiable
minor included in the pictures, just as the Second Circuit had done.172
Mecham argued that due to the absence of the underlying sexual abuse of
children, and the fact that there was no pictured abuse, his images were entitled
to protection.173 This argument relies on United States v. Stevens, which held
that animal “crush” videos could not be categorically excluded from First
Amendment protection because the underlying criminal conduct was absent.174
This argument was rejected because despite there not being any child abuse
portrayed in the morphed images, these images do compromise “the reputational
and emotional harm to children that has long been a justification for excluding
real child pornography from the First Amendment.”175 The Fifth Circuit goes on
to argue that because there is more jurisprudence on the issue of child
pornography and the harms done to children in the process that Stevens is not
persuasive enough to conclude otherwise.176
One of the major concerns the Fifth Circuit found was that “limiting the
categorical exclusion of child pornography to images depicting criminal abuse
of children [would] be . . . significant.”177 The court discussed that this is due to
the fact that the definition for child pornography does not solely include sexual
abuse of a minor, but also includes those images of a minor that depict
“lascivious exhibition of the anus, genitals, or pubic area.”178 The court reasons
that taking on this view of child pornography would exclude many prosecutions
involving children that do not depict actual abuse and therefore limit even those

whether they more closely emulate images that are wholly virtual, i.e., images that do not
involve the interests of real children).
171 Id. at 263 (nothing that to determine if images are protected or not within the meaning
of the First Amendment jurisprudence it is necessary to determine whether they are more
like imagery that involves the direct abuse of children, i.e., traditional child pornography, or
whether they more closely emulate images that are wholly virtual, i.e., images that do not
involve the interests of real children).
172 Id.; see generally United States v. Hotaling, 634 F.3d 725 (2d Cir. 2011).
173 Mecham, 950 F.3d at 263.
174 Id. at 263–64 (distinguishing the Eighth Circuit case which held that the important
factor under United States v. Stevens was whether the underlying criminal conduct was
present and therefore child pornography must include the actual abuse of a child, whether it
is a child whose face is included or not, to be excluded from First Amendment protection).
175 Id. at 265; see also Doe v. Boland, 698 F.3d 877, 834 (6th Cir. 2021); Hotaling, 634
F.3d at 725.
176 Mecham, 950 F.3d at 265.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 266.
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prosecutions of traditional child pornography.179 Therefore, the Fifth Circuit
held “because morphed child pornography depicts an identifiable child, it falls
outside the First Amendment.”180 Again, the issue falls closer to the standard set
forth in Ferber, but the Fifth Circuit does not address the concern of
technology’s ability to make it appear as if the interests of real children are
implicated.181 It appears, however, the Supreme Court is not yet ready to address
the circuit split or the issue of whether morphed images are protected speech as
this case was denied certiorari on petition to the Supreme Court.182
C. Sixth Circuit
The Sixth Circuit in Doe v. Boland similarly held morphed imagery as being
closer to real child pornography and therefore outside of First Amendment
protection.183 Boland, a lawyer and expert of technology, downloaded stock
images of children and morphed their faces onto adult bodies engaged in sexual
activity.184 The court affirmed many of the same principles in Ferber when they
stated “governments have a compelling interest in protecting children from
abuse, the value of using children in pornography is nonexistent, and the market
for child pornography is ‘intrinsically related’ to the underlying abuse.”185
The Sixth Circuit also paid attention to the Supreme Court’s reticence in
addressing the issue of morphed images, but took into account its mentioning of
the problem with morphed imagery is that it does include real children and
therefore may lean more towards real child pornography than wholly virtual
child pornography.186 The court used the argument from Ashcroft that the
categorical ban on virtual images violated the First Amendment because there
was no harm to actual children, but left over the question of morphed imagery
implying that this type of imagery leans more towards the traditional definition
of child pornography because those images “implicate the interests of real
children.”187 The first rejection to the protection under the First Amendment is
that there is actual harm done to actual children and the second rejection is the
small level of expressive value in morphed imagery.188
Id. at 266–67.
Id. at 267.
181 Kornegay, supra note 43, at 2148.
182 Mecham, 950 F.3d at 266–67, cert. denied, 950 F.3d 257 (5th Cir. 2020).
183 Doe v. Boland, 698 F.3d 877, 884 (6th Cir. 2012).
184 Id. at 879 (6th Cir. 2012) (setting forth the defendant’s purpose was to prove that
persons may not always be aware when they are viewing child pornography).
185 Id. at 883 (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 (1982)).
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Id.
179
180
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In Boland, real children are involved in the images and are clearly
identifiable.189 Moreover, the court identifies the second reasoning for refusing
to protect these images under the First Amendment is “[t]he relatively weak
expressive value of morphed images.”190 The court clearly made their position
known: “[t]he ‘evil’ of child pornography ‘so overwhelmingly outweighs the
expressive interests, if any, at stake’ in this form of communication that lies
categorically beyond constitutional protection, meaning that ‘no process of caseby-case adjudication is required’ to uphold restrictions on it.”191 Because of
these arguments, the Sixth Circuit also held that morphed imagery is not
protected under the First Amendment.192 The Sixth Circuit follows the same
logical reasoning as the Second and Fifth Circuit—when the interests of an
identifiable minor are implicated, the images are clearly unprotected.193
However, the court left open the issue of when these images clearly are not
virtually created, but may not necessarily implicate the interests of real,
identifiable children.194
D. Eighth Circuit
The Eighth Circuit, on the other hand, has found that morphed images do not
fall outside of First Amendment protection.195 In this case, defendant Anderson
sent pictures over Facebook to his minor half-sister that had her face
superimposed over the face of an adult women engaged in sexually explicit
activity.196 The court relied on the following two previous cases that addressed
the issue of child pornography and First Amendment protection.197 The first is
United States v. Stevens, discussed in detail above.198 The Supreme Court
determined that “child pornography was categorically unprotected in Ferber
because it involved visual depictions that were produced through sexual abuse
of one or more children.”199 Furthermore, the court affirmed that First
Amendment protection does not depend on a “simple cost-benefit analysis,” but
is given to every category of speech that was seen to be historically included
within the protections of the First Amendment.200 The Supreme Court relied on
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200

Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 762–63 (1982)).
Id. at 884
United States v. Mecham, 950 F.3d 257, 265 (5th Cir. 2020).
Id.; United States v. Hotaling, 634 F.3d 728 (2d Cir. 2011).
United States v. Anderson, 759 F.3d 891, 895 (8th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 893.
Id. at 894.
Id.
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 471 (2010); Anderson, 759 F.3d at 894.
Stevens, 559 U.S. at 471; Anderson, 759 F.3d at 894.
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Ferber’s holding that child pornography has been historically outside of the
protections of the First Amendment and not as a result of a cost-benefit
analysis.201
The second case relied on by the court, and by the defendant in his argument,
was United States v. Bach, where the underlying sexually explicit image was
that of a minor and therefore “implicated the interests of real child and . . .
record[ed] a crime.”202 The court in Bach identified that the underlying concerns
from Ferber were implicated and thus the pictures were unprotected speech.203
However, the images in Anderson were those of an adult woman with the
digitally imposed face of a minor, meaning no child was abused in the
production of the image.204 Using Stevens as a guide, the Court determined that
the evidence was enough to prove that the images produced by Anderson were
not within the class of speech protected by the First Amendment.205 Therefore,
to determine if these morphed images fall outside of First Amendment
protection, they would either need to include the underlying criminal conduct or
be within a category historically unprotected by the First Amendment.206
The Eighth Circuit takes the approach that Congress was concerned with
when enacting the PROTECT Act.207 Because the Eighth Circuit relies so
heavily on the underlying criminal conduct and the historical buckets of
protection under the First Amendment, there is a huge class of persons affected
by these images that are without legal recourse in the Eighth Circuit.208 Without
this protection, the millions of images not involving the abuse of children but
including the interests of an identifiable minor will be protected speech under
the First Amendment. The Eighth Circuit gives too much credence to cases, such
as Stevens, that factually did not involve the interests of children, but were
discussing obscenity within the context of materials involving adults.209
V. LEGAL ANALYSIS
Child pornography laws attempt to reconcile two extremely compelling but
often competing interests: first, the interest of protecting the freedom of speech
as guaranteed by the First Amendment and second, the interest in protecting
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children from sexual exploitation and abuse.210 The “compelling nature of the
government’s interest in preventing the sexual exploitation of children” is
balanced “against the First Amendment interests implicated in content-based
prohibitions of speech.”211 Early Supreme Court decisions could have hardly
imagined the technological advances that would make it possible to create the
same images without having sexually abused children in the creation of the
images. While it is true that children whose faces are used in the production of
morphed imagery will not have the ultimate trauma of having survived sexual
abuse, they are nonetheless harmed by the photos production as supported by
the holdings of the Second, Sixth, and Eighths circuits.212 One issue associated
with child pornography, caused by the rapid growth of technology, is that child
pornography has become so pervasive in society that it is “nearly commonplace,
and the minors who comprise these images number in the hundreds of
thousands.”213 Millions of child pornography images are shared on the internet
through social media platforms, totaling over 45 million images reported by
major tech companies such as Facebook and WhatsApp.214
The Supreme Court should follow Congress and the Second, Sixth and Eighth
Circuits and find morphed imagery to fall outside of the protections of the First
Amendment—especially when there is an identifiable child used in the picture.
Morphed images often involve the use of innocent photographs of children
found on the internet, usually shared by their parents and found on social
media.215 More often than not, the children used in the morphed images “were
never photographed for pornographic purposes.”216 These children often suffer
trauma once the image has been circulated and there is typically no easy way to
ensure the image is forever deleted from the internet.217
Since Ferber, courts have consistently emphasized government’s concern
with the harm done to children. In Ferber, this harm was obvious, as the images
implicated the physical and psychological well-being of the children depicted in
the images.218 The circuits that have held morphed imagery as close to traditional
child pornography have consistently emphasized this underlying harm to
children, regardless of whether or not the child was actually abused in the
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making of the images.219 Since Stevens, the Supreme Court has left no doubt that
it understands the unique problem child pornography poses today.220 Further, the
Court underscores that the reproduction, distribution, and possession of these
images furthers the abuse felt by victims of these images.221 The demand for
child pornography “harms children [because] it drives production.”222 The
Supreme Court in 2014 acknowledged the role technology plays in the
exacerbation of this problem because of the ease with which images are now
traded.223
The Supreme Court in Ashcroft, despite its rejection of upholding the
legislation of child pornography, did not hold that morphed imagery was
unprotected speech within the meaning of the First Amendment.224 Instead,
“although morphed images may fall within the definition of virtual child
pornography, they implicate the interests of real children and are in that sense
closer to the images in Ferber” leaving open the possibility of regulation of these
images down the road.225 The Court underscored the importance of protecting
children and the types of harms children face in the creation and distribution of
these morphed images.226
Since Ashcroft was decided in 2002, technology has evolved in ways that the
Supreme Court never could have imagined it would in just 20 years. In her
dissent in Ashcroft, Justice O’Connor proposed that the analysis should turn on
whether the image at issue implicated the interest of a person “virtually
indistinguishable” from an actual child.227 She believed that this language and
analysis would adequately protect a person’s right to the freedom of speech in
219 See United States v. Hotaling, 634 F.3d 729–30 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding that the
actual harm to minors was the fact that they were clearly identifiable in the pictures and
therefore implicated their interests despite there being no underlying abuse done in the
creation of the photographs); see also United States v. Mecham, 950 F.3d 257, 261 (5th Cir.
2020) (discussing that harms done to children in the creation and distribution of morphed
images undoubtedly implicate the interests of real, identifiable children); see also Doe v.
Boland, 698 F.3d 877, 883 (6th Cir. 2012) (noting that the interests of real children are
implicated in these images and there is no artistic or literary value in extending First
Amendment protections to these images).
220 See Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434, 439–40 (2014); see United States v.
Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 299 (2008) (holding that the solicitation of child pornography or
the offers to sell child pornography are categorically excluded form First Amendment
protection even if both are for wholly virtual child pornography which is marketed as
including real children).
221 Paroline, 572 U.S. at 436.
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the realm of wholly virtual child pornography while also adequately protecting
the rights of children.228
One example that the Supreme Court did not anticipate in its Ashcroft holding
is the current problem with “deepfakes,” which “refer to manipulated videos, or
other digital representations produced by sophisticated artificial intelligence,
that yield fabricated images and sounds that appear to be real.” 229 The problem
with this growing technology is that it is now readily available to anyone to
create videos of persons that others will believe is real, even though it is not.230
This technology is rapidly growing and becoming easier to use, and is already
being used to create videos of political candidates, celebrities, and others which
depict those persons saying things they never in fact said.231 Furthermore, deep
fake technology has already been used in the pornography context.232 Any
person’s face, body, or voice can now be used with the help of deepfake
technology to create pornographic videos in which (1) an adult never consented
or (2) that does not depict the actual sexual abuse of a child.233 This type of
technology poses a problem for the current standing of child pornography
regulations. Justice Thomas, in his concurrence in Ashcroft, warned precisely of
this problem stating, “technology may evolve to the point where it becomes
impossible to enforce actual child pornography laws because the government
cannot prove that certain pornographic images are of real children.”234
One parallel area of pornography regulation is “revenge porn”—or “sexually
explicit images of a person posted online without a person’s consent especially
in the form of revenge or harassment.”235 Forty-six U.S. states have passed laws
making it a crime to distribute pornographic materials known as “revenge
porn.”236 This is clearly harmful to a person’s psychological well-being and
physical safety.237 For example, the District of Columbia’s regulation of revenge
Id. at 264 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
Grace Shao, What ‘Deepfakes’ Are and How They May Be Dangerous, CNBC (Jan.
17, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/14/what-is-deepfake-and-how-it-might-bedangerous.html.
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porn defines the harm as “any injury, whether physical or nonphysical, including
psychological, financial, or reputational injury.”238 Oftentimes, these images are
initially created with consent, but then subsequently shared without consent.239
The law in this area focuses both on the distribution and the disclosure of these
images.240
The concerns associated with child pornography are akin to the concerns
associated with revenge porn, as the courts and legislature have both focused on
the harms done as a result of the images. However, the difference with revenge
porn is that the images contain adults rather than children. Forty-six states have
already determined that the nonconsensual sharing of images of adults taken
originally with consent is enough for criminal penalties.241 If the harm done by
these “revenge porn” images is enough to prohibit the extension of First
Amendment protections, then certainly those morphed images which implicate
the physical, emotional, and mental well-being of a child should also be enough
for those images to also fall outside of the protections of the First Amendment.
Morphed images sit at a gap in law as it relates to child exploitation, with the
conflicting interests of protecting children from their innocent images being used
in an explicit way and the constitutional considerations and protections of free
speech which the Supreme Court has placed limits in the area of a state’s
regulation of child pornography.242 One state, Alaska, may provide a model to
other states that are working within the Supreme Court’s guidance to prohibit
morphed images.243 Alaska’s statute provides that it is a crime to knowingly
possess sexually explicit images that are a “depiction of a part of an actual child
under 18 years of age who, by manipulation, creation, or modification, appears
to be engaged in the conduct.”244 Alaska expanded its definition of child
pornography to include those images which “make it appear that the actual child
is engaged in sexual conduct.”245 The Alaska Court of Appeals determined that
a defendant must only have a “substantial probability” that “the materials [the

238 Criminalization of Nonconsensual Pornography Act of 2014, D.C. CODE § 22-3051–
57 (2014).
239 Katherine Gabriel, Feminist Revenge: Seeking Justice for Victims of Nonconsensual
Pornography Through “Revenge Porn” Reform, 44 VT. L. REV. 849, 852 (2020).
240 Id. at 855.
241 See generally 46 States + DC + One Territory Now Have Revenge Porn Laws, supra
note 14.
242 Daisy Gray, Do You Know It When You See It? Using Alaska’s Child Pornography
Statute as a Nationwide Model for Proscribing Morphed Images, 38 ALASKA L. REV. 231,
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defendant] possessed depicted a minor.”246
Alaska’s approach takes into consideration the need to protect the First
Amendment right to freedom of speech, while also accepting that these morphed
images “harm children in a manner distinct from virtual child pornography,
implicating the perceptible interests of actual minors.”247 Because the Supreme
Court has not yet weighed in specifically on the issue of morphed images, it is
imperative that states follow in the footsteps of Alaska and criminalize morphed
imagery.248 This approach also satisfies strict scrutiny and the approach set forth
in Ferber.249 The state has a compelling interest in “protecting children from the
psychological and reputational harms flowing from morphed images” and in the
case of the Alaskan statute “[it] is narrowly tailored to address only pornographic
images that have the potential harm to real children.”250
Alaska, likewise, has criminalized the dissemination of revenge porn, leading
to the conclusion that from a policy perspective the state believes that the
nonconsensual sharing of an image that was taken with consent and the sharing
of an image of a child who’s identifiable likeness is used, although not
necessarily depicting the abuse of that child, but depicting a recognizable child
in images of sexually explicit conduct, is worth regulation.251 Other states should
follow in Alaska’s footsteps and implement legislation that is narrowly tailored
to serve the end of prohibiting morphed imagery that uses identifiable
children.252 This would serve a legitimate public and state interest and at the
same time respect the fundamental right set forth in the Constitution protecting
the freedom of speech. Furthermore, “because Alaska’s statute both functionally
prohibits the range of conduct that is capable of harming children while
remaining narrowly tailored to that end, other states seeking to update their child
pornography statutes should incorporate language from Alaska’s.”253
VI. CONCLUSION
Child pornography, or child sexual abuse material, is harmful. It is harmful to
the children involved whether they were physically abused in the creation of the
images or innocent images of them were morphed into depictions that made
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them appear to be engaged in sexually explicit activity.254 The internet has made
this problem exceedingly worse; providing the channels for easy distribution of
these images as well as allowing the market for child pornography to flourish.255
The first step in addressing the issue of child pornography is to acknowledge
how pervasive this issue is on internet platforms and figure out how to address
these places that allow the proliferation of child sexual abuse imagery.
The natural starting point of child pornography regulation is to discuss the
First Amendment protections as they relate to the freedom of speech. The First
Amendment requires respect for the freedom of speech, and the government may
only regulate speech based on its content when it passes a strict scrutiny test.256
Traditional child pornography, which involves the creation of images through
the, often violent, sexual abuse of minors, falls fully outside of the protections
of the First Amendment.257 Virtual child pornography, on the other hand,
describes those images that are made through computer generated images and
falls within speech protected by the First Amendment.258
The history of the regulation of these types of images has proved to be a battle
of tug-of-war between the Supreme Court and the legislature in balancing the
protections of the First Amendment right to the freedom of speech against need
to ensure that children are adequately protected.259 This has led to a circuit split
that falls short of resolving the problem across the board for child pornography
regulation.260 The Supreme Court should follow Congress and find that morphed
imagery falls outside of First Amendment protections. much like the
criminalization of revenge porn, morphed child pornography implicates the
physical and psychological well-being of children, who are continually harmed
with the distribution of these images. 261 Furthermore, the Supreme Court should
find that laws prohibiting morphed child imagery, much like those in Alaska, are
narrowly tailored and pass strict scrutiny.262 As the Supreme Court noted in
Ashcroft, these images uniquely implicate the interests of real children, whose
pictures and faces are used to create sexually explicit images.263 The Supreme
Court noted that this makes morphed imagery fall closer to traditional images of
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child pornography, meaning that the possibility of regulation is left open.264
Thus, with support from the Supreme Court and a clear indication from
Congress, throughout their legislative history on this issue, that they wish to
regulate these types of images, the Supreme Court should follow the Second,
Fifth, and Sixth Circuits and hold that morphed child pornography falls outside
of First Amendment protections.265
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